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---------------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs adopt appellant's statement of the 
nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs adopt appellant's statement of the 
disposition in the lower court. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a ruling that the trial judge was 
correct in denying an award of attorney's fees and costs 
incurred by appellant in bringing the interpleader action. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs adopt appellant's statement of facts. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ARE 
PROPERLY AWARDED ONLY WHEN AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE 
OR BY EXPRESS TERMS OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
Utah law is clear that the court may award attor-
ney's fees only when such an award is authorized by statute 
or by express terms in a contract between the parties. 
Walker v. Sandwick, 548 P.2d 1273, Utah 1976; Cluff v. Culmer, 
556 P.2d 498, Utah 1976; Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 
Utah 1977; Hawkins v. Perry, 126 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 
(1953); Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 10 
A.L.R. 3d 449 (1964). 
Utah's rule regarding interpleader actions, Rule 22, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, makes no provisions for an 
award of attorney's fees nor, in this action, is there any 
agreement or contract between plaintiffs and Tracy Realty 
Company, the interpleader and appellant, permitting such an 
award. Therefore, the ruling of the trial court denying 
Tracy Realty Company attorney's fees was proper and should 
not be disturbed. 
Appellant points to the case of Maycock v. 
Continental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179 (1932), 
in which the interpleader's request for attorney's fees was 
. 2. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
denied, as supporting its position that attorney's fees 
should be awarded in the instant case. The facts of the 
Maycock case are remarkably similar to those here. Maycock, 
the plaintiff, claiming to be a beneficiary of an insurance 
policy of the decedent, filed an action against Ogden State 
Bank, the executor of the estate, and against Continental 
Life Insurance Company, which issued the policy. The insur-
ance company filed an answer (which is very similar to the 
one filed by Tracy Realty in the instant case) alleging, 
among other things, that it was without sufficient knowledge 
to form a belief as to plaintiff's allegations and that it 
was ready and willing to pay the proceeds to the proper 
party but that it was unable to determine who the proper 
party was. No answer was filed by the bank, and a default 
judgment was entered against it. Similarly, in the instant 
case, no answer was filed by defendant Brisboisies, and a 
default judgment was entered against them. 
The court in Maycock subsequently found that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the insurance proceeds and denied 
the insurance company's request for attorney's fees. The 
Utah Supreme Court upheld the lower court's denial of attor-
ney's fees. Among the court's criticisms of the insurance 
company's actions was that the company, despite its stated 
willingness to pay the proceeds to the proper party, had 
also "assumed the role . . . of a defendant resisting plain-
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tiff's claim to the proceeds of the policy." Tracy Realty 
has assumed a similar role in that it resisted plaintiffs' 
claim to the money because of defendant Shirley Brisbois' 
instructions not to pay the money to plaintiffs. If the 
court now follows the reasoning of Maycock, the denial of 
attorney's fees to Tracy Realty will likewise be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
INTERPLEADER ACTIONS. 
Appellant states that the "common fund doctrine" 
is a recognized exception to the rule of no attorney's feu 
unless authorized by statute or contract. This doctrine 
states that a court of equity may, in its discretion, pro-
perly award attorney's fees to one who, at his own expense, 
has maintained a successful suit to preserve, protect, or 
increase a common fund or has brought into court a fund 
which others may share with him. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs, 
Sec. 83. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge the correctness of 
this ruling; however, it has no applicability to interpleader 
actions. An interpleader action involves a situation wherein 
two or more parties are claiming a right to the same fund, 
and the stakeholder, claiming no interest in the fund, 
deposits the fund with the court, leaving all claimants to 
litigate their claims so that it can be determined who is 
entitled to the fund. The interpleader is not preserving, 
protecting, or increasing a common fund; rather, he is 
. 4. 
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protecting himself from multiple claims or against liability 
should he pay the funds to the wrong person. An action 
concerning a connnon fund involves a situation wherein a 
party brings an action to actually preserve, create, or 
increase a common fund. "The rule rests upon the ground 
that where one litigant has borne the burden and expense of 
the litigation that has inured to the benefit of others as 
well as to himself, those who have shared in the benefits 
should contribute to the expense." 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Costs, 
Sec. 83. 
Appellant has cited no case in which attorney's 
fees have been awarded to the interpleader-stakeholder based 
on the theory of the common fund. 
Buford v. Tobacco Growers Co-op Association, 42 
F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930), cited by appellant, was not an 
interpleader action. The Tobacco Growers Co-op Association 
had brought an action asking that the court appoint receivers 
on the ground of mismanagement and imminent insolvency of 
the association. As a result, receivers were appointed, and 
a fund of $500,000 was realized. Had the suit not been 
instituted, the fund would not have been realized. 
In Estate of Johnson, 27 Or. App. 461, 556 P.2d 
969 (1976), also cited by appellant, the estate's personal 
representative, who was one of three equal beneficiaries, 
filed an accounting which failed to include a certain bank 
account. One of the other beneficiaries filed an action 
. 5. 
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claiming that account should have been included, and the 
court agreed. The person bringing the suit was awarded his 
attorney's fees because his action increased the value of 
the estate by more than $11,000, and therefore, those who 
benefited should share the cost. 
Gold Dust Corporation v. Hoffenberg, 87 F. 2d 451 
(2nd Cir. 1937), and Hsu Ying Liv. Tang, 87 Wash. 2d 796, 
557 P.2d 342 (1976), two other common fund doctrine cases 
cited by appellant, were likewise not interpleader actions. 
On page 7 of its brief, appellant states: "A 
majority of American jurisdictions including all federal 
courts have interpreted their interpleader statutes to allow 
attorney's fees and costs under the common fund doctrine." 
However, not one of the interpleader cases cited on pages 8, 
9, or 10 in support of that proposition even mentioned the 
common fund doctrine. In fact, most of those cases support 
the proposition that an award of attorney's fees would not 
be proper in the instant case. 
The following cases, all cited by appellant, 
illustrate the above: 
Ferber Co. v. Ondrick, 310 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 
1962): The lower court denied attorney's fees, and the 
appellant court affirmed, stating that the lower court did 
not abuse its discretion. No mention was made of the 
common fund doctrine. 
. 6. 
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A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 303 F.2d 
648 (2nd Cir. 1962): The interpleader was allowed costs and 
attorney's fees because the plaintiff unjustifiably resisted 
the interpleader action, but the case does not make it clear 
whether attorney's fees were charged to the firm or to the 
plaintiff/appellant. 
Board of Education of Raleigh County v. Winding 
Gulf Collieries, 152 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1946): Attorney's 
fees were awarded to the interpleader because a West Virginia 
law, Chap. 107, Sec. 6, Code, specifically authorized the 
court in interpleader actions to make orders regarding costs 
and attorney's fees. 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Oliver, 412 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 
1969): The court refused to award attorney's fees, stating 
" ... the matter is ultimately vested within the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge. 3 A. J. Moore, Federal Practice, 
Paragraph 22.16, at 3144-45. We find no abuse of discretion 
here." 
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Beardslee, 
216 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1954): The insurance company inter-
pleader was not awarded attorney's fees. One of the claim-
ant's to the fund received attorney's fees because the court 
found the action filed against her was vexacious, and she 
was awarded costs and fees pursuant to statute, Chap. 73, 
Paragraph 767, Section 155, of the Illinois Revised Statutes . 
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Home Ins. Co. v. Burns, 474 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 
1973): The question of attorney's fees had not been deter-
mined by the district court. The appellant court ordered 
the district court to exercise its discretion and make a 
determination as to whether attorney's fees should be awardei 
Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin 
v. Jarde, 73 N .M. 371, 388 P. 2d 382 (1963): Attorney's fees 
were awarded pursuant to statute, 59-10-23(D), N.M.S.A., 
1953 Comp. 
Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla. 
1964): This was not an interpleader action. Plaintiff had 
requested attorney's fees out of a common fund. The trial 
court denied the request, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
upheld the ruling, further found no common fund existed, and 
emphasized "the rule that a court of equity may allow counsel 
fees to an attorney who has created a fund does not apply 
where there has been neither a creation, addition, nor 
protection of a 'common fund'. " 
Greshem State Bank v. O.K. Construction Co., 370 
P.2d 726 (Or. 1962): Attorney's fees were awarded to the 
interpleader but not out of the fund deposited in court; 
instead, the court ordered that the losing party be charged. 
"Where attorney's fees and costs and disbursements are 
allowed, they must ultimately be borne by the losing party 
brought into the interpleader proceedings." 
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Appellant further states on page 10 of its brief 
that although the interpleader statute of California does 
not provide for an award of attorney's fees, the court, in 
Fritschi v. Teed, 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114 
(1963), nevertheless made such an award. Attorney's fees 
were indeed awarded but, contrary to appellant's conclusion, 
pursuant to statute. The court stated: "The judgment under 
appeal ordered that these sums [attorney's fees and costs] 
be included in the costs payable by plaintiff Mrs. Fritschi. 
Her counsel contends that 'there is no statutory basis that 
award an attorney fee in a case of this nature. ' The 
statutory basis for this award is Section 386.6 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure." 
As seen from the foregoing, the cases cited by 
appellant offer no support for the position that the common 
fund doctrine authorizes an award of attorney's fees to an 
in terp leader. 
POINT III 
ALTHOUGH FEDERAL COURTS HAVE, IN SOME CASES, 
AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE INTERPLEADER IN 
INTERPLEADER ACTIONS, THE COURT HAS EMPHASIZED 
THAT SUCH AN AWARD IS DISCRETIONARY. 
Appellant relies heavily on the practice in federal 
court of awarding attorney's fees in interpleader actions, 
suggesting that, since federal rules and Utah rules regarding 
interpleaders are similar, Utah should follow the federal 
practice. As pointed out in Point II, many of the cases 
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cited by appellant do not actually support its position. In 
addition, and equally important, is the fact that the federa! 
courts continually emphasize that an award of attorney's 
fee is discretionary. 
See Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Riddle, 222 
Fed. Supp. 867 (Tenn. 1963), wherein the court said: 
The plaintiff had a right as a stakeholder, 
acting in good faith, to maintain this action in 
interpleader to avoid the vexation and expense of 
resisting the adverse claims, even though its 
officials believed only one of them was merito-
rious . . . ; but that right did not include a 
further right to impress the fund with the expense 
of interpleading it. 
If the rule were otherwise, every stakeholder 
confronted with two or more adverse claimants who 
are claiming, or might claim, to be entitled to 
money or property could interplead the fund, 
depositing within the registry of the court, ga~ 
the protection afforded the stakeholder by an 
adjudication, and, in effect, cause the successf~ 
claimant to bear the costs, counsel fees, and 
expenses of the interpleading action. 
For similar pronouncements, see First Nat. Bank 
of Circle v. Garner, 567 ~.2d 40 (Mont. 1977); Stuyvesant 
Insurance Co. v. Dean Construction Co., 254 Fed. Supp. 102 
(N.Y. 1966), aff. 382 F.2d 991; American Smelt & Refin. Co. 
v. Naviera Andes Peruana, S.A., 208 Fed. Supp. 164 (Calif. 
1962), aff. 327 F.2d 581; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gustafson, 
415 Fed. Supp. 615 (Ill. 1976). 
The federal courts have also recognized that where 
an interpleader action is brought in federal court and where 
no federal interest is perceived, the court should look to 
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state law to determine the attorney's fee question. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Miller, 299 
Fed. Supp. 1018 (Minn. 1964). Therefore, had this action 
been brought in federal court, the federal judge would have 
looked to Utah law to determine whether attorney's fees 
could be properly awarded. The Utah court should do no 
less. 
POINT IV 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN THIS ACTION ARE COSTS 
OF THE INTERPLEADER'S BUSINESS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE 
BORNE BY THE PREVAILING CLAIMANT 
It is common business practice and procedure for a 
realty company to hold a deposit tendered by a prospective 
buyer. The standard earnest money agreement contains a 
provision that if the buyer defaults the seller may retain 
the deposit as liquidated damages. Every time a default 
occurs, a realty company faces the decision of whether to 
deliver the deposit to the seller pursuant to the contract 
or, if the buyer demands, to return the deposit to the 
buyer. That such a situation can and will arise is inherent 
in the real estate business. Such a risk is foreseeable and 
should be regarded as a cost of doing business. Such busi-
ness costs are not recoverable as attorney's fees. In 
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488 (2nd 
Cir. 1965), the stakeholder insurance company brought an 
interpleader action alleging it had been served with claims 
.11. 
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by several claimants to insurance proceeds. The court 
denied attorney's fees to the insurance company stating: 
We are not impressed with the notion that 
whenever a minor problem arises in the payment of 
insurance policies, insurers may, as a matter of 
course, transfer a part of their ordinary cost ~ 
doing business to their insureds by bringing an 
action of interpleader. Denial of allowances [for 
attorney's fees] in this case was by no means an 
abuse discretion. 
See also Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gustafson, supra, 
where the court stated: 
Although it is true that an interpleader 
action benefits both claimant and the court by 
promoting the expeditious resolution of a contro-
versy in one form, the chief beneficiary of an 
interpleader action is the insurance company. An 
inevitable and normal risk of the insurance busi-
ness is the possibility of conflicting claims to 
the proceeds of a policy. An interpleader action 
relieves the company of this risk by eliminating 
the potential harassment and expense of a multi-
plicity of claims and suits. Furthermore, it 
discharges the company from all liability in 
regard to the fund. It thus seems unreasonable to 
award an insurance company fees for bringing an 
action which is primarily in its own self-interest. 
If Tracy Realty is permitted an award of attorney's 
fees out of the buyer's deposit in this case, it will have 
been able to shift the cost of its business to one of the 
claimants. 
But more importantly, this cost would have been 
shifted to the claimant whom the court determined to be 
correct in its position. If any party is to be charged with 
Tracy Realty's attorney's fees, it should be the defaulting 
buyer, not the sellers who prevailed. See Greshem State 
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Bank v. O.K. Construction Co., supra, and First Nat. Bank 
of Circle v. Garner, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of attorney's fees should 
be upheld for the following reasons: 
1. Utah law permits an award of attorney's 
fees only when authorized by statute or contract between 
the parties. 
2. The common fund doctrine permitting 
attorney's fees has no applicability to interpleader 
actions. 
3. An award of attorney's fees is within 
the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision 
should not be disturbed unless abusive discretion is 
shown. 
4. Awarding attorney's fees to the inter-
pleader here would be enabling it to shift the cost of 
business to one of the claimants. 
5. Making an award of attorney's fees out 
of the fund deposited with the court charges the pre-
vailing party with the interpleader's attorney's fees. 
Dated this B ~ day of December, 1978 . 
. 13. 
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